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Judicial Reform as a Tug of War:
How Ideological Differences Between
Politicians and the Bar Explain
Attempts at Judicial Reform
Adam Bonica*
Maya Sen**
What predicts attempts at judicial reform? We develop a broad,
generalizable framework that both explains and predicts attempts at
judicial reform. Specifically, we explore the political tug of war created
by the polarizationbetween the bar and political actors, in tandem with
existing judicialselection mechanisms. The more liberal the bar and the
more conservative political actors, the greater the incentive political
actors will have to introduce ideology into judicial selection. (And, vice
versa, the more conservative the barand the more liberalpolitical actors,
the greater incentive political actors will have to introduce ideology into
judicialselection.) Understandingthis dynamic, we argue, is key to both
explaining and predicting attempts at judicial reform. For example,
under most ideologicalconfigurations, conservatives will, depending on
how liberal they perceive the bar to be, push reform efforts toward
partisanelections and executive appointments, while liberals will work
to maintain merit-orientedcommissions. We explore the contours of this
predictive framework with three in-depth, illustrative case studies:
Floridain 2001, Kansas in the 2010s, and North Carolinain 2016.
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INTRODUCTION

In 2001, the Florida Supreme Court gained national notoriety
when it ordered the initial recounting of ballots in the 2000 presidential
election race between Al Gore and George W. Bush-prolonging the
election and leading to the eventual involvement of the U.S. Supreme
Court. For many Democrats and liberals, the involvement of the Florida
court was a welcome revival of their waning hopes for the White House.
But for many Republicans and conservatives, the actions of the Florida
Supreme Court in ordering a recount were tantamount to nothing more
than an outrageous involvement of a liberal "activist" court in the
election process. This anger soon turned to action: in response, the state
legislature, with the support of then-Governor Jeb Bush, a Republican,
enacted several reform measures designed to lessen the power of the
Florida Bar Association over the Florida Supreme Court. These
reforms, in tandem with years of Republican governors, have scaled
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back the liberal nature of the court. In 2001, the state supreme court
was comprised of seven Democrats; today, it is comprised of four
Republicans, two Democrats, and one justice jointly nominated by an
outgoing Democrat and an incoming Republican. No longer is the
Florida Supreme Court a solidly liberal institution.
The case of the Florida Supreme Court illustrates the important
issue of judicial reform, which we address in this Article. How states
choose their judges is a product of deep political forces and tensions,
and political actors may have strong reasons to favor one kind of
selection mechanism over another. In addition, and again illustrated by
the case of Florida, these circumstances can change depending not just
on who is in power, but which way the bar leans. Thus, in the case of
Florida, the perceived "liberal bias" of the Florida Bar Association led
the state's Republican political establishment to attempt to reduce its
influence. This has been echoed in many other states, several of which
have moved to reduce what they perceive to be the undue influence of a
"liberal" bar.
We incorporate these ideas into a broad, generalizable argument
that both explains and predicts attempts at judicial reform. Specifically,
we explore various dynamics created by ideological disagreement
between the bar and political actors, in tandem with existing judicial
selection mechanisms. Our argument is simple: the more liberal the bar
and the more conservative political actors, the greater the incentives
political actors will have to introduce ideology into judicial selection and
to limit the formal role played by the bar in judicial selection. (And, vice
versa, the more conservative the bar and the more liberal political
actors, the greater the incentive political actors will have to introduce
ideology into judicial selection.) The actual sequence of events
necessarily depends on the existing judicial selection mechanisms. For
example, as we argue below, conservatives would be loath to move away
from a judicial selection mechanism that naturally favors them, as
would liberals. Thus, we explore the consequences of our framework in
terms of efforts to reform existing judicial selection mechanisms,
oftentimes in the context of political attempts to move away from meritoriented commissions.
We note that our arguments here bypass some of the normative
considerations commonly raised by scholars of judicial reform-which
tend to center around judicial independence, the "quality" of candidates
to judicial office, and whether judges are unduly influenced by
partisanship or campaigning concerns. While those are, of course,
salient concerns, our arguments here center more on what kinds of
selection mechanisms will benefit political parties from their strategic
perspective. That is, Democrats will prefer more liberal judges and
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Republicans will prefer more conservative judges. Indeed, our
argument is that it is the ideology of the judiciary-as opposed to
genuine concerns about legitimacy or qualifications-that ultimately
shape political actors' preferences on how judges should be selected,
perhaps superseding other considerations.
This Article is organized as follows. We begin in Part I by
providing a short context on the history of judicial reform attempts.
This discussion is by no means exhaustive, but it does provide a useful
roadmap for contextualizing current reform efforts. In Part II, we
provide a theoretical discussion of the forces that we believe will give
rise to judicial reform attempts-including the tug of war between state
bar associations and political actors. Specifically, we delineate possible
outcomes under various hypothetical scenarios, including (1) a liberal
bar, conservative political actors, and a conservative judiciary; (2) a
liberal bar, conservative actors, and a liberal judiciary; and (3) a
conservative bar, conservative actors, and a liberal judiciary. Such
dynamics, we argue, are key to both understanding and predicting
attempts at judicial reform. Next, in Part III, we contextualize these
further with three illustrative case studies: (1) Florida in 2001, (2)
Kansas in the 2010s, and (3) North Carolina in 2016. Lastly, we
conclude by noting what our argument means-and does not mean-for
the composition of the judiciary and for attempts at judicial reform.
I. JuDIcIAL REFORM BACKGROUND

A short background on the history of judicial reform provides
context for the discussion to follow.
A. Independence and Establishment of American Courts
At the time of the country's founding, Anglo-American judges
were generally appointed by the Crown. This political tradition was
passed on to the colonies, whose early judges were also Crown
appointments and, accordingly, representatives of the English
monarchy. In the uneasy transition into American independence, this
practice was generally followed but modified to suit the needs of the
new democracy: the founders thus established a federal judiciary
(modeled on the state systems of Massachusetts and Virginia) in which
the executive would make appointments. As a check on the power of the
executive, however, the lifetime appointment of judges was conditioned
on the "advice and consent" of the Senate. These checks, according to
Alexander Hamilton in Federalist Number 76, would provide "an
excellent check upon a spirit of favoritism in the President, and would
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tend greatly to prevent the appointment of unfit characters from State
prejudice, from family connection, from personal attachment, or from a
view to popularity."' In addition, the federal system was similar to those
used by the first states joining the union-namely states in New
England and along the eastern seaboard. 2 For example, "[o]f these
original states, seven provided for selection of judges by the legislature,
five by governor and council, and one, Delaware, by governor and
legislature." 3 Indeed, today, several of these Northeastern states,
including Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and New Jersey, still have
a judicial selection system that relies on some sort of executive
appointment.
The 1830s and 1840s not only saw territorial expansion and the
admission of new states into the union, but a rising interest in populism
and more direct rule. For many, the idea of an elite judiciary, appointed
for life by the executive, undermined this desire for self-rule and
smacked of elitism and privilege; these sentiments were no doubt
stoked by the fact that many lawyers were educated in faraway areas,
such as Boston and New Haven, and had no connection to either local
customs or to the local business and political elite.
These increasing populist sentiments ripened the movement
away from executive appointments and toward judicial elections. By
1812, the first local judges were being elected in Georgia, with
Mississippi being the first state to have an entirely elected judiciary.4
Even states that had a long history of executive appointments moved
toward judicial elections, starting with New York at its constitutional
convention in 1846. This included Georgia, Maryland, Virginia, and
Pennsylvania-all of which now have either hybrid or elected judicial
systems.5 These early elected judiciaries, however, relied primarily on
partisan elections, meaning either that the partisan affiliation of the
judges was available to voters or that the slate of judicial candidates
presented was somehow tied to the parties. These partisan pressures in
turn opened up significant venues for political parties to exercise
control over elected judiciaries. The situation was particularly
contested in New York City, in which the notorious Tammany Hall
network of Democratic Party operatives "aroused public indignation by
1.
THE FEDERALIST No. 76, at 457 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
2.
This is not surprising, as the judicial systems of two colonies-Virginia and
Massachusetts-were explicitly considered examples for the federal system that was to follow.
3.
Glenn R. Winters, Selection of Judges-An HistoricalIntroduction, 44 TEX. L. REV. 1081,
1082 (1966).
4.
Id.
5.
As Winters notes, "New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island, New
Jersey, Delaware, and South Carolina resisted and to this day have never had elected judges." Id.
at 1082-83.
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ousting able judges and putting in incompetent ones."6 Thus, the move

toward judicial elections was neither without controversy nor
universally supported.
In response to these questionable practices, the pendulum
swung back toward appointments systems in the post-Civil War period.
New York did not return to an appointments-based system, but some
states did-these included Vermont and Mississippi. It was also around
this time period that other states began experimenting with
nonpartisan electoral systems, particularly around the turn of the
twentieth century. This included states in the upper and industrialized
Midwest (Ohio, Michigan) and in the Sun Belt (for example, Arizona).
However, the continued use of judicial elections-even
nonpartisan ones-discomfited intellectual elites and members of the
legal academy. Roscoe Pound, future dean of Harvard Law School,
noted in a 1906 speech to the American Bar Association that part of the
reason why Americans were frustrated with the administration of
justice was due to "[p]utting courts into politics and compelling judges
to become politicians, [which] in many jurisdictions has almost
destroyed the traditional respect for the bench." 7 Undergirding these
arguments was a concern that those elected judges would not just lack
independence, but that they reflected the worst that the bar could
offer-less refined in intellect and more sensitive to the crass
partisanship of electoral politics.
Perhaps the strongest advocate for reconsidering judicial
selection systems that relied on judicial elections was Albert M. Kales,
a professor at Northwestern Law School and one of the founders of the
American Judicature Society (and its director from the Society's start
in 1913 until his death in 1922). Kales took a hard stance against the
political machinery behind judicial elections. Discussing judicial
selection in his hometown of Chicago, for example, he noted that
our judges, while they go through the form of election, are not selected by the people at
all. They are appointed. The appointing power is lodged with the leaders of the party
machines. These men appoint the nominees.... The voter only selects which of two or
three appointing powers he prefers. Whichever way he votes he merely approves an
8
appointment by party organization leaders.

In response to these developments, Kales encouraged something
different-a system of choosing candidates that he believed was both
more transparent and also more deeply engaged with the bar and its
6.
Id. at 1083.
7.
Roscoe Pound, The Causes of PopularDissatisfactionwith the Administration of Justice,
8 BAYLOR L. REV. 1, 23 (1956).
8.
Albert M. Kales, Methods of Selecting and Retiring Judges, 11 J. AM. JUDICATURE SoC'Y
133, 134-35 (1928).
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expertise. Specifically, he advocated a system whereby a nonpartisan
group of lawyers would name a slate of judicial candidates that voters
(or even the executive) could then choose from.
These intellectual efforts marked the beginnings of "merit plan"
systems, 9 but it was not until 1937 that the American Bar Association
endorsed these types of plans. It was another three years before any
state enacted a state-wide merit-oriented system-with Missouri doing
so in 1940. (These merit-oriented plans are thus known as "Missouri
Plans.") In the twenty-five years that followed, nearly a dozen states
included some sort of merit commission in their judicial selection
systems. These include Alabama (1950), Kansas (1958), Iowa (1962),
Nebraska (1962), Illinois (1962), Florida (1964), Colorado (1964), Utah
(1965), and North Dakota (1965). By 1990, a plurality of states had
moved to a merit-oriented commission system. And, as of 2016, a total
of twenty-six states used merit commissions to select judges.1 0
In terms of the discussion that follows, an important point is
that nearly all of the judicial reform attempts in the late twentieth
century involved states moving away from partisan and nonpartisan
elections and toward merit-oriented commissions, as opposed to
gubernatorial (or legislative) appointments. As we discuss below,
however, judicial reform attempts today usually involve states moving
away from the use of merit-oriented commissions.
II. WHAT PREDICTS JUDICIAL REFORM ATTEMPTS IN THE MODERN ERA?
The previous discussion explained how the various states
developed their patchwork of judicial selection systems, with a number
using merit-oriented criteria, others using elections, and still others
using executive appointments. However, these are by no means static,
and, as the example of Florida in the Introduction demonstrates,
political actors across the country are constantly seeking out ways to
modify judicial selection systems. But what predicts judicial reform
attempts? And what kind of reforms would we hope to predict?

9.
For more on the historical origins of merit selection, and of the resulting political
implications, see Brian T. Fitzpatrick, The Politics of Merit Selection, 74 MO. L. REV. 675, 677-78
(2009).
10. For a historical summary of judicial selection methods in the states dating back to the
nation's
founding,
see
Judicial
Selection
in
the
States,
BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/Judicial-selection in the states
(last
visited
Sept.
28,
2017)
[https://perma.cc/PG4A-JQX4].
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A. A Predictive Theory of JudicialReform
A useful starting point in developing a framework that predicts
the timing and nature of judicial reform attempts is the important fact
that all judges were at some point attorneys. That is, judges are, with
rare exceptions, drawn from the pool of attorneys available in a state."
This means that the ideological leanings of the bar set the conditions
and provide incentives for how political actors will approach judicial
selection. For example, if the bar-that is, the pool of attorneys in a
given state-tends to be more liberal, then this would introduce
incentives for more conservative politicians to restrict the role of the bar
in judicial selection. Contrariwise, for more liberal political actors, this
would create incentives for them to seek out ways to involve the bar;
after all, in such cases, the bar's interest and the interests of political
actors are aligned. The opposite scenarios would unfold if attorneys
skew conservative: if the bar skews conservative, then this would create
incentives for more liberal politicians to restrict the role of the bar.
Contrariwise, for more conservative politicians, having a more
conservative bar involved in the selection of judges would be completely
acceptable, since the interests of the two would be in ideological
alignment. This simple tension between the bar and political actors
characterizes the "tug of war" over the judiciary.
This tug of war is, however, hardly taking place on neutral
territory. The judicial selection mechanism in place plays a significant
role in determining the ideological tenor of the judiciary, thus creating
incentives for increasing politicization or, alternatively, leaving things
as is. For example, when the bar is left-leaning, liberal political actors
might be content with a judicial system that heavily involves state and
local bar associations; in such a scenario, conservatives might be
content with (depending on political configurations) executive or
legislative appointments. Regardless of the leanings of political actors,
a merit-oriented system-such as the Missouri plan-will result in a
judiciary that more or less resembles the ideological profile of
attorneys. 12 On the other hand, a selection mechanism that allows
ideology to be a factor in the selection of judges-for example,
gubernatorial selection or partisan elections-gives political actors

11. There could, of course, be exceptions to this. For example, voters could, in some
circumstances, probably consider judicial candidates coming in from out of state. To our
knowledge, this is rare.
12. These are points made throughout by Fitzpatrick, supranote 9, at 676 ("[Mlerit selection
may simply move the politics of judicial selection into closer alignment with the ideological
preferences of the bar.").
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more flexibility in manipulating the ultimate ideology of the judicial
bench.
Thus, we have two competing forces. Political actors of both
conservative and liberal stripes will want judges who resemble them
ideologically and, in instances to the contrary, will look to judicial
reforms to accomplish this simple goal. However, the nature of judicial
reforms will depend on the existing legal climate and the political
interests of the bar, taken in tandem with the existing judicial selection
mechanism. The two forces at play are thus (1) the ideological leanings
of the dominant party players and (2) the ideological leanings of the bar.
Both of these are grounded within the extant judicial selection systems.
B. Hypothetical Examples
We illustrate some of these scenarios with hypothetical
examples. In each of the examples, (1) "A" indicates the average
ideological position of the professional bar (that is, the attorneys from
which judges are drawn); (2) "P' indicates the average ideological
positioning of politicians; 13 and (3) "J'indicates the average ideological
positioning of the judiciary. We assume, we think quite reasonably, that
political actors (P) will want judges (J) to be as ideologically close to
them as possible. We also assume that the ideological positioning of
attorneys (A) and politicians (P) might be different.
For example, consider a situation like Figure 1. In this scenario,
attorneys are on average to the left politically, and political actors are
on average to the right. This is not an unusual scenario. As documented
by several studies, 14 nearly every state has a professional bar that is
more liberal than the state's political actors, and it is not uncommon for
Republican-dominated legislatures in solidly conservative states to
coexist with liberal-leaning bars. This "red state, blue bar" dilemma is
often a source of political tension and can give rise to heated
interbranch conflicts regarding the role of the bar. This is the case, for

13. For example, this would be the average ideology of all state representatives (the general
assembly and the state senate) in each state, as well as the ideology of the executive. In our
example of North Carolina, discussed below, we consider how the ideological leanings of voters
play a role in this dynamic.
14. See, e.g., Adam Bonica et al., The PoliticalIdeologies of American Lawyers, 8 J. LEGAL
ANALYSIS 277 (2016); Adam Bonica & Maya Sen, The Politics of Selecting the Bench from the Bar:
The Legal Profession and PartisanIncentives to Politicize the Judiciary (Harvard Kennedy Sch.
Faculty Research Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. RWPl5-001, 2015),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2577378 [https://perma.cc/SZ4U-LGQK]; see also Fitzpatrick, supra note
9, at 692-702 (analyzing data from two merit commission states, Tennessee and Missouri).
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example, in places like Arkansas, Kansas, Missouri, Montana, North
Carolina, New York, Pennsylvania, Washington, and Virginia.15
FIGURE 1: IDEOLOGICAL ARRANGEMENT WHERE ATTORNEYS ARE TO THE
LEFT IDEOLOGICALLY AND POLITICAL ACTORS ARE TO THE RIGHT.
JUDGES ARE IN BETWEEN, BUT CLOSER TO POLITICAL ACTORS THAN TO
ATTORNEYS.

More
Liberal

A

JP
1

More
Conservative

In the case represented by Figure 1, however, the pertinent
political actors have little incentive to change the judicial selection
system. Why? The judges in this scenario are already fairly close to the
ideological positioning of political actors, and changing the judicial
selection system could potentially risk moving judges ideologically
closer to the pool of attorneys-and away from the ideology of political
actors. Indeed, if political actors attempted to reform the system toward
greater inclusion of the bar and its interests-perhaps via a meritoriented system-then the positioning of Jwould likely move away from
P and closer to A. This would be undesirable from the perspective of the
pertinent political actors (although perhaps of interest for more leftleaning political minorities).
Another realistic scenario is presented in Figure 2, which shows
a similar pattern in that the average attorney ideology is to the left,
while the average political actor's ideology is to the right. 16 This
scenario departs from Figure 1, however, in that Figure 2's judges (J)
are on average closer to the ideological positioning of attorneys than
they are to political actors. This scenario characterizes the actual
situation in several states, including Kansas, South Carolina, and New
Mexico.

15. See Bonica & Sen, supra note 14, at 23.
16. This is again consistent with scholarship on the bar and its political leanings, although
the polarity could be reversed, and the example and our discussion would still apply.
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FIGURE 2: IDEOLOGICAL ARRANGEMENT WHERE ATTORNEYS ARE TO THE
LEFT IDEOLOGICALLY AND POLITICAL ACTORS ARE TO THE RIGHT.
JUDGES ARE IN BETWEEN, BUT CLOSER TO ATTORNEYS THAN TO
POLITICAL ACTORS.

More
Liberal

A

J

P

More
Conservative

The incentives that political actors face in Figure 2 are different
than the incentives in Figure 1. What would our theory say about
attempts at judicial reform here? We would expect that, in the long run,
this would be an unstable arrangement. Specifically, political actors
would over time become frustrated with a judiciary that is out of
ideological alignment with themselves (and possibly also with voters,
although we find limited evidence of this when we examine the example
of North Carolina, below). Indeed, Figure 2 represents a situation ripe
for attempts at judicial reform-or, more precisely, at attempts at
shifting the ideology of the judiciary to be more in line with the
governing party elites.
The nature of the reform in Figure 2 would depend, however, on
the existing system of judicial selection. If this was a state in which
judges were selected via a merit-oriented commission (or nonpartisan
elections, perhaps), we would expect the majority party to attempt to
reform the system by strengthening the role of the executive or by
making the election process more explicitly partisan. We would also
expect relevant political actors-for example, majority-party members
in the state assembly-to try to limit the role of the bar in the
recruitment or selection of judges. In addition, as we discuss below in
the case of North Carolina, in instances where judicial reform might
prove unpopular with the public, we might also see attempts to
manipulate the overall configuration of the courts-including
procedural processes that must be observed-to serve the benefit of the
political party in power.
As other scholarship has explored, these two scenarios capture
much of what we see across the fifty states.17 However, we note that a

17. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 9, at 683 (examining judicial retention through a merit
commission versus partisan election). See generally Bonica & Sen, supra note 14, at 9, 23
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remaining possibility is that the judiciary is more ideologically extreme
(either on the conservative side or on the liberal side) than both political
actors and attorneys. Figure 3 depicts this kind of arrangement:
FIGURE 3: IDEOLOGICAL ARRANGEMENT WHERE JUDGES ARE
IDEOLOGICALLY DISTANT FROM BOTH ATTORNEYS AND LAWYERS.

More
Uberal

J

AP

More
Conservative

In Figure 3, A and P are quite close to each other, but both are
distant from J. We view this situation as remarkably untenable: both
attorneys and political actors are ideologically distant from judges,
which means that both entities have an incentive to try to shift the
positioning of judges-in this case in the same ideological direction.
(Again, the polarities could be reversed, from judges being more liberal
to judges being more conservative, but the intuition is the same.) In
such scenarios, we would expect that political actors push for judicial
reform; however, they would also have no reason to exclude the
professional bar in these attempts, since the bar is ideologically aligned
with political actors and would help "shift" the judiciary closer. We
would therefore not be surprised if judicial reform attempts in these
instances would move toward merit-oriented commissions or other
systems that involve the bar. We do not rule out that this kind of
scenario would also result in attempts to introduce elections (partisan
or nonpartisan) or even executive appointments; but, to the extent that
merit commissions are politically uncontroversial, we would think that
this move would be the most straightforward. Indeed, in a state such as
this, judicial reform attempts would be a win-win for both the
professional lawyers' associations and for political actors as a whole.
We conclude this discussion by noting that previous scholarship
has suggested that most states fall under the categories described by
Figures 1 and 2, which in turn sets the stage for our case studies

(examining partisan elections versus merit retention and their effects on the politicization of the
judiciary).
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below.1 8 Substantially fewer, if any, fall under the situation described
by Figure 3.19 We think the reason why is straightforward: Figure 3
presents an unstable configuration, one in which all of the pertinent
parties have an incentive to move forward with judicial reform.
III. THREE CASE STUDIES OF JUDICIAL REFORM ATTEMPTS: FLORIDA,
KANSAS, AND NORTH CAROLINA

We now turn to exploring the contours of this predictive
paradigm with three diverse examples: (1) Florida in 2001, shortly after
the explosive events of Bush v. Gore, (2) Kansas following the rise of the
Tea Party movement in the late 2000s, and (3) most recently, North
Carolina after the extremely divisive general election of 2016. For each
of the case studies, we start with a brief overview of the political
environment at the time and then discuss the existing method of
judicial selection, the ideology of the bar and of political actors, and the
nature of proposed reforms.
A. A Liberal Court Goes Too Far: The Case of Floridain 2001
As we noted in our Introduction, the Florida Supreme Court took
the national stage shortly after the 2000 presidential election. To give
some context for the judicial reforms that followed, the election was held
on November 7, 2000. It became increasingly clear in the days following
the election that the victor would be decided exclusively by Florida,
which at that point was too close for officials to call. In response, several
Florida counties-including the heavily Democratic areas of Palm
Beach and Broward Counties-began the process of recounting ballots
cast. However, on November 15, the Florida Secretary of State filed
paperwork in the Florida courts to try to stop these recounts,
presumably because they would favor Democratic Party nominee Al
Gore. These challenges ultimately landed in the Florida Supreme
Court, which, on December 8, 2000, issued a 4-3 ruling that ordered
statewide recounts to continue.
This ruling was unusual for several reasons. First, the Florida
Supreme Court had, at the time, tended to reach mostly unanimous

18. For an overview of the number of states that might fall into these categories, see Bonica
& Sen, supra note 14, at 22, which compares the average ideology of judges, politicians, and
attorneys by state.
19. As noted by Bonica and Sen, only a handful of states appear to fit this profile. Id. This
includes the interesting case of Connecticut. One possible reason why may be the strong presence
of Yale Law School, graduates of which tend to be more liberal than graduates of other law schools.
See Bonica et al., supra note 14, at 302-04.
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rulings, 20 making the narrow 4-3 ruling an anomaly. Second, the ruling,
unlike most run-of-the-mill state court rulings, had significant
nationwide impact, throwing the presidential election into a state of
prolonged uncertainty. Lastly, all seven of the judges on the Florida
Supreme Court at the time had been appointed by a Democratic
governor. 21 This fact led many-particularly those in national-level
politics-to think that the ruling was politically motivated, with the
state justices' ideology playing a decisive role. 2 2 For many Republicans
and conservatives, the actions of the Florida Supreme Court in ordering
a recount were tantamount to nothing more than an outrageous
involvement of a liberal court in the election process.23
With this hyperpartisan context in mind, we now apply our
framework to understanding the judicial reforms that followed. As in
the other case studies below, we start with (1) judicial selection at the
time of reform, followed by (2) ideologies of the bar and of political
actors, and then conclude with (3) the nature of reforms.

20. David Firestone, Contesting the Vote: The Overview; Florida Court Backs Recount; Bush
Appealing to U.S. Justices, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 9, 2000), http://www.nytimes.com/2000/
12/09/us/contesting-vote-overview-florida-court-backs-recount-bush-appealing-us-justices.html
?mcubz=l [https://perma.cc/DP93-664V].
21.

See JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE NINE: INSIDE THE SECRET WORLD OF THE SUPREME COURT 174

&

(2008). These were Charles Wells (the Chief Judge), Henry Lee Anstead, Major Harding, Barbara
Pariente, Peggy Quince, and Leander Shaw. Note that, while all seven justices had been appointed
by Democratic governors, statistical measures of judicial ideology indicate that the court was not
uniformly liberal but was instead comprised of liberals and moderates. See Adam Bonica & Maya
Sen, A Common-Space Scaling of the American Judiciaryand Legal Profession, 25 POL. ANALYSIS
114, 117-20 (2017) (explaining framework for measuring ideology). Using the data from Bonica
Sen, supra, we calculated that the split in the 4-3 decision is perfectly predicted along ideological
lines. See Adam Bonica, Replication Datafor: A Common-Space Scaling of the American Judiciary
and

Legal

Profession, POL.

ANALYSIS

DATAVERSE

(2016),

https://dataverse.harvard.edul

dataset.xhtml?persistentld=doi:10.7910/DVN/RPZLMY [https://perma.cc/A6XQ-XQF5] (providing
data and coding for Bonica & Sen's A Common-Space Scaling, supra). Specifically, the majority
was comprised of the four most liberal justices according to the Bonica & Sen data-Anstead,
Pariente, Lewis, and Quince-and the dissent was from the three more moderate justices
according to the same data-Shaw, Wells, and Harding.
22. Many commentators believed that the lack of credibility of an all-Democrat (and widely
recognized as liberal) state supreme court involving itself on behalf of a Democratic candidate was
a key reason why the U.S. Supreme Court became involved. TOOBIN, supranote 21, at 180. Toobin,
for example, notes that "[t]he conservatives, especially Scalia, were outraged that the Florida
Supreme Court seemed to be rewriting the state election code. He wanted to slap that court down,
at least rhetorically. O'Connor, too, didn't like the way the Florida justices appeared to be
freelancing-and helping Gore." Id.
23. The U.S. Supreme Court eventually intervened and, in its own 5-4 ruling along partisan
lines, ended the Florida recounts; Gore conceded to Bush shortly thereafter. See Bush v. Gore, 531
U.S. 98 (2000).
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1. Judicial Selection at Time of Reform
In 2000, Florida relied on the Missouri Plan to choose its
judges. 24 According to one overview, "[u]nder this system, a judicial
nominating commission composes a list of potential nominees, which is
then given to the governor, who selects from among the listed
individuals. After serving for one year, the incumbent stands in a
retention election and, if successful, serves a term of six years." 2 5 The
Florida bar had an important role to play in these commissions.
Specifically, of the nine members on the Judicial Nominating
Commission, three were chosen by the governor, three by the Florida
Bar Association, and three jointly by the governor and the Bar. This
meant that "the political views of the Bar influence the types of
individuals recommended for selection and, thus, are material to
understanding the political dynamics affecting appellate judicial
selection." 26
2. Ideology of the Bar and of Political Actors
Among Florida political observers, the sentiment at the time was
that the Florida bar was overwhelmingly left leaning, 2 7 and many
Republicans believed this to be the case. For example, in endorsing the
proposed judicial reform, one Republican state representative wrote
that the Florida bar "has an agenda. Like the [American Bar
Association], the Florida bar claims to be non-partisan, yet the Florida
bar has appointed more than twice as many Democrats as Republicans
to the present Circuit Court JNC. That's 60% to 25%--hardly a balanced
number." 28 The same representative went on to complain that the
sadly unfortunate truth is that the JNC process has gained a reputation for nominating
judges based on politics, rather than the qualifications of the applicants. The fact is, in

24. Florida voters chose to change the method of selecting judges in 1976, from nonpartisan
elections to a merit commission. For this and more on the history of judicial selection in Florida,
see Drew Noble Lanier & Roger Handberg, In the Eye of the Hurricane:FloridaCourts, Judicial
Independence, and Politics, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1029, 1032 (2002). Lanier and Handberg note
that the ruling in Bush v. Gore was not the first instance of the Florida Supreme Court irking
Republican state politicians. Id. at 1045. Specifically, "the court came into conflict with the
Republican-controlled legislature and Republican Governor [Jeb] Bush in the Spring of 1999 for
invalidating laws that would have accelerated death penalty executions in the state in the wake
of one inmate being bloodied during an electrocution." Id.
25. Id. at 1032 n.12.
26. Id. at 1044.
27. See Bonica et al., supranote 14, at 298-99, and Bonica & Sen, supra note 14, at 21-22,
for quantitative measures documenting this. See also Lanier & Handberg, supra note 24, at 104445, for a discussion of the political environment.
28. Johnnie Byrd, JNC Reform is Timely, ASSOCIATED INDUSTRIES FLA. (Jan. 1, 2001),
http://www.aif.com/information/2001/snOlOlOl.html [https://perma.cc[LRH2-LYJC].
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other professions such as medicine, nursing, and real estate, it is the Governor who
determines who will serve on their professional boards. The Florida Bar, when selecting
29
nominees, has a vested interest. They will be trying their cases in front of these judges.

These sentiments appear to have some basis in those studies
examining the topic.30

On the other hand, while the Florida bar had a reputation for
being liberal, the pertinent political actors leaned to the right
ideologically. At the time of the 2000 election and its aftermath,
Republicans controlled the executive office (held by then-Governor Jeb
Bush, brother of Republican Presidential nominee George W. Bush), the
State Senate, and the State House.
3. Proposed Judicial Reforms
According to our theory, Florida in 2000 represented exactly the
scenario we would expect to generate judicial reform efforts, driven
largely by political actors looking to shift the composition of the
judiciary. Three factors point to this. First, the ideology of the bar was
significantly to the left in comparison to the ideology of the state's
lawmakers, suggesting a configuration like the one we describe in
Figure 2. (Again, the relative positioning makes no difference; we likely
would have seen the same attempts at reform if the ideology of the bar
and the judiciary were significantly to the right of state lawmakers.)
Second, the state had a merit-oriented system that gave wide latitude
to the state's bar association and, by extension, the state's lawyers.
Reform that would shift power away from the bar would therefore have
been attractive to political actors. Lastly, the Florida Supreme Court's
ruling intervening in the U.S. presidential election in favor of Democrat
Al Gore provided the perfect justification for Republicans in the state
legislature to push for judicial reform. 31

29. Id.
30. For example, Bonica and Sen, supra note 14, at 22-23, report a left-leaning Florida bar,
one that is to the left of both politicians and the judiciary (estimated with data from 2014). In
addition, looking at the quantitative data described in Bonica & Sen, id. at 48, we further examined
contributions from 36,352 attorneys active in Florida circa 2000. Approximately 60% of attorneys
in this Florida-based sample had donated primarily to Democrats. This provides additional
evidence of a left-leaning bar.
31. Note that our framework does not require an exogenous shock such as a contested
presidential election, and it seems likely, given the ideologies of the various actors involved, that
judicial reform was a question of when, rather than if. For example, by many accounts, murmurs
of judicial reform were seen as early as Jeb Bush's gubernatorial election in 1998. See Valeria
Hendricks, "Fixing"the Unbroken JudicialNominating Commissions: View from a Survivor of the
2001 Legislative Session, REC.: J. APP. PRAC. SEC. FLA. B., Summer 2001, at 7; Gwyneth K. Shaw,
Republicans Try to Cut Influence of Florida Bar, ORLANDO SENTINEL (Apr. 23, 2001),
http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/2001-04-23/news/0104230194_1_florida-bar-brummer-bar-
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Our general predictions were borne out by two judicial reform
attempts that immediately followed the 2000 election. The first, House
Bill 367,32 was oriented toward limiting the Florida Bar Association's
power over the state's judicial nominating commissions. 33 Under the
previous system, three of the nine judicial nominating commission
members were chosen by the bar itself, three were chosen by the
governor, and three were chosen jointly by the bar and governor
together. By contrast, the reforms called for the governor to choose four
names from a list put forth by the bar association, with the remaining
names to be chosen by the governor directly-thus significantly
lessening the bar's control of the commission. This reform measure was
passed by both chambers in the Florida Assembly and was signed into
law by then-Governor Jeb Bush in June of 2001. As one scholarly review
noted, this reform had the effect of "giving [Governor Bush] all but total
control of the selection [of] Florida's appellate judges and a heightened
degree of influence over the state's trial courts when there is an interim
appointment." 34
Second, the Florida legislature considered a series of (ultimately
unsuccessful) bills designed to strip power away from the state's judicial
nominating commissions and move them toward the governor. For
example, Senate Bill 179435 was a proposed amendment to the Florida
constitution that would have had the effect of requiring judges on the
Florida district court and appeals court running for reelection to win a
two-thirds majority of votes in order to stay in their seats-a significant
hurdle. If a judge lost his retention bid, then the Florida governor
would, with a Senate confirmation, have the ability to make the
appointment. This bill would have also eliminated Florida's judicial
nominating commissions altogether and-in a move that would have
likely gutted the bar's professional standing-would have removed the
requirement that state attorneys must join the Florida State Bar.
Another constitutional proposal, House Joint Resolution 627, would
have eliminated judicial nominating commissions and moved that
power to the governor, with confirmation by the Senate. 36 And yet

&

officials [https://perma.cc/X6SK-936Z]. However, the fiasco surrounding Bush v. Gore no doubt
hastened this path and provided the impetus for reform attempts.
32. FLA. STAT. § 43.291 (2017).
33. For additional discussion of these reform efforts, see Lanier & Handberg, supra note 24,
at 1049-50. See also Hendricks, supra note 31, at 7 (explaining that House Bill 367 provided the
governor with greater power to ensure appointments better reflected gender, racial, and
geographic makeup of jurisdiction).
34. Lanier & Handberg, supra note 24, at 1049-50.
35. S.B. 1794, 103d Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2001). For a discussion of this proposal, see Lanier
Handberg, supra note 24, at 1050.
36. See Hendricks, supra note 31, at 8.

1798

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70:6:1781

another constitutional proposal, House Joint Resolution 827, would also
have given the Florida governor the power to name judicial candidates,
but would have kept judicial nominating commissions insofar as they
would "certify to the governor a list of all qualified candidates."3 7
For its part, the state bar association adamantly opposed these
proposals, and its president wrote a strongly worded letter to all
lawyers licensed by the state. In it, he warned that the bar's own legal
counsel believed that the "overall effect of the [constitutional
amendment] would be to increase the influence of politics in the court
system and would set our state back 100 years." 38 He further wrote that
the reform attempts "would remove all checks on the politicization of
judicial selection, place incumbent judges at the whim of the legislature
or any groups dissatisfied with a particular decision, and significantly
reduce the independence of the judiciary, a critical element in the
maintenance of a just and democratic society." 3 9 Ultimately, even
though these proposals to amend the Florida constitution died in
various judicial oversight committees, they nonetheless represented a
significant attack on the role played by the Florida bar in the selection
of state judges.
B. PoliticiansMove to the Right: Kansas in the 2010s
We now turn to another example that illustrates the tensions
between a liberal bar and conservative political actors: Kansas in the
early 2010s. Unlike Florida in 2001, Kansas experienced no single
exogenous political shock in the form of a closely watched national
election. The state was, however, similar to many other states in the
early 2010s in that it experienced a very strong shift to the right among
its political class due to the mobilization of the conservative Tea Party.
This makes Kansas similar to other states that underwent a
comparable political shift-including Missouri and Arkansas.

37. Id. Hendricks further explains:
Under House Joint Resolution 827, the Florida Constitution would still confer the
governor with the power to nominate and the senate to confirm judicial candidate [sic],
but JNCs would still be kept to certify to the governor a list of all qualified candidates.
Additionally, the resolution granted the governor, instead of the supreme court, the
power to establish uniform rules of procedure for the JNCs. Finally, this legislation
would have made the JNC deliberations public. Both House Joint Resolutions 627 and
827 died in the Judicial Oversight Committee.
Id.
38. Herman J. Russomanno, Protecting the Independence of FloridaLawyers, FLA. B.J., Apr.
2001, at 6, 6 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Barry Richard).
39. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Barry Richard).
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1. Judicial Selection at Time of Attempted Reform
Under Kansas's version of the Missouri Plan, a nominating
commission composed of five lawyers (chosen by the state's bar) and
four nonlawyers (chosen by the governor) would recommend a set of
names to the Kansas governor; the governor would then choose his
appointments from the list.40 Judges would then be subject to periodic
retention elections.4 1 A nominating commission was used not only for
Kansas's state supreme court and appeals court judges, but also, as of
1972, its district court (trial) judges. 42
Important to note is that the Kansas Supreme Court, unlike the
Florida Supreme Court, did not have a reputation as an
overwhelmingly liberal court. According to one account, "[t]he court is
largely viewed as [a] moderate, reasonable, and business-friendly" 43
court. However, although the court had a reputation for being moderate
and business friendly, and although Kansas did not have a specific Bush
v. Gore moment like the Florida Supreme Court did, a series of
unfavorable rulings on important conservative issues galvanized
opposition on the more extreme right. The first of these was the Kansas
Supreme Court's 2014 reversal of the death sentences of Reginald and
Jonathan Carr, who had been found guilty of a series of gruesome
murders known as the "Wichita Massacre." The second was a 2014
ruling regarding the method by which the state of Kansas funded its
public schools. 44 In that ruling, the Kansas Supreme Court struck down
40. Specifically, Kansas's plan works as follows:
The supreme court nominating commission submits a list of qualified individuals to the
governor for supreme court appointments. ... The supreme court nominating
commission is composed of five lawyer members and four nonlawyer members (one

lawyer and one nonlawyer member from each congressional district, and one additional
lawyer member who serves as chairperson). Lawyer members are elected by their peers
in each congressional district, and nonlawyer members are appointed by the governor.
Commission members serve four-year terms.

See
Methods
of
Judicial Selection:
Kansas,
NAT'L
CTR.
FOR
ST.
CTS.,
http://www.judicialselection.us/judicial-selection/methods/judicial-nominating-commissions.cfm?
state=KS (last visited Sept. 29, 2017) [https://perma.ccfMNH8-CP34].
41. As of this writing, no justices of the Kansas Supreme Court had ever been voted out of
office via a retention election. Lincoln Caplan, The Political War Against the Kansas Supreme
Court, NEW YORKER (Feb. 5, 2016), http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-political-waragainst-the-kansas-supreme-court [https://perma.cc/CXX9-VLJ9]
42. Jeffrey D. Jackson, The Selection of Judges in Kansas:A Comparisonof Systems, J. KAN.
B. AsS'N, Jan. 2000, at 32, 34-35.
43. Caplan, supra note 41.
44. See Steve Rose, Attempt to Oust Kansas Supreme Court Judges Is Likely Doomed, KAN.
CITY STAR (June 18, 2016, 3:00 PM), http://www.kansascity.com/opinion/opn-columns-blogs/steverose/article84456322.html [https://perma.cc/HKE3-A9PJ]
("Conservatives have a list of
grievances, including rulings on abortion laws and capital punishment, but it is the high court's
mandate that the Legislature fund schools equitably that has really lit the fires.").
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the public school funding provisions as being unequal and insufficient,
instructing the state legislature to provide more funding to poorer
districts. 45
Both rulings engendered backlash against the Kansas Supreme
Court among conservatives and provided a target for conservatives'
frustration. For example, the Wichita Massacre's families organized in
favor of defeating the retention prospects of several of the state justices.
(These efforts were ultimately unsuccessful, as all of the justices
eventually won their retention elections.) Political actors also joined the
criticism. The President of the Kansas Senate, a Republican,
complained that the supreme court was engaged in "[a] political
bullying tactic" and "an assault on Kansas families, taxpayers and
elected appropriators" for its actions on the school funding issue. 46
Thus, although there was no exogenous political shock, tensions about
the state judiciary had been building.
2. Ideology of the Bar and of Political Actors
In tandem with these developments, the early 2010s saw a move
to the right for Kansas's politics. Specifically, the 2010, 2012, and 2014
state elections led to strongly conservative Republicans gaining
political clout within the state legislature, pushing more centrist
Republicans toward a pragmatic alignment with Democrats and
weakening the moderate position.47 In the executive branch, former
U.S. Senator Sam Brownback, a conservative Republican backed by the
state's Tea Party, won the 2010 and 2014 gubernatorial races. In
attempting what he called a "real live experiment," Brownback began
enacting a slew of conservative reforms, including instituting generous
tax breaks, tightening of welfare requirements, cutting the education
budget, and eliminating four state agencies. 48 The power of the new
conservative wing in Kansas led to increased attacks on the Kansas
judiciary. One member of the Kansas House of Representatives
45. See Gannon v. State, 319 P.3d 1196, 1251-53 (Kan. 2014) (affirming that, in violation of
its duty to provide equity in public education, the State established wealth-based disparities by
withholding funding from certain school districts).
46. Erik Eckholm, Outragedby Kansas Justices'Rulings,Republicans Seek to Reshape Court,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 1, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/02/us/outraged-by-kansas-justicesrulings-gop-seeks-to-reshape-court.html?mcubz=1 [https://perma.cc/ZGB5-UQU2].
47. See Ammon Simon, The Battle for Kansas, NAT'LREV.: BENCH MEMOS (July 20, 2012, 4:40
PM),
http://www.nationalreview.com/bench-memos/310188/battle-kansas-ammon-simon
[https://perma.ce/3D3B-5L8W].
48. Eric Levitz, The RepublicanParty Must Answer for What It Did to Kansas and Louisiana,
N.Y.
MAG.:
DAILY
INTELLIGENCER
(Mar.
18,
2016,
11:48
AM),
http://nymag.comldaily/intelligencer/2016/03/gop-must-answer-for-what-it-did-to-kansas.html
[https://perma.cc/B497-H3SU].
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complained that the selection process via merit commission made it
"virtually impossible" for "prominent conservatives" to be appointed to
state appellate courts, and that the process "tends to exclude others who
are equally qualified because they don't fit the preferred political
profile."49

By contrast, the Kansas Bar Association-including several
members of the legal elite-did not see itself as part of this rightward
shift. Indeed, like other state bars, the Kansas bar had the reputation
of being liberal. This is largely borne out by existing scholarship.5 0 Of
5,812 attorneys practicing in Kansas as of 2012, 2,211 are on record as
having donated to political campaigns. Of those, 1,400 (or roughly 63%)
had donated primarily to Democrats. This is in a deeply Republican
state where Mitt Romney won 61% of the two-party presidential vote
share and Republicans held 92 of 125 seats (74%) in the state house, 31
of 40 seats (75%) in the state senate, the Governor's mansion, and all
six congressional seats.
This configuration meant that the existing legal establishment
tended to favor the involvement of the bar and the status quo. For
example, one sitting supreme court justice commented that "[t]he meritbased system has served Kansas well and is held in high regard across
the country, as evidenced by the fact it is utilized in nearly three-fourths
of all states for appointments to some or all of those states' courts. I am
not persuaded Kansans should compromise and accept the second-best
system."5 1
3. Proposed Judicial Reforms
These tensions led to a number of proposed judicial reforms
instigated by the Republicans in the Kansas State Legislature as well
as in the governor's mansion. We note three specific attempts.
The first, in 2011, was an attempt to eliminate the role of a
judicial nominating commission by moving Kansas to a system similar
to the federal one. Under the law, the governor would appoint members
of the Kansas Supreme Court directly (with no nominating
commission), with the advice and consent of the Senate. The bill was
supported by the Tea Party-backed Governor and passed the House of

49. Ammon Simon, Kansas Update, NAT'L REV.: BENCH MEMOS (Nov. 28, 2012, 10:36 AM),
http://www.nationalreview.com/bench-memos/334250/kansas-update-ammon-simon
[https://perma.cclB3BU-8QLE] (discussing reaction of House Judiciary Committee Chairman
Lance Kinzer and including quotes given by Kinzer to media outlets).
50. See, e.g., Bonica et al., supranote 14, at 297-99.
51. 2016 Voter Guide: Marla Lukert, TOPEKA CAP.-J., http://cjonline.com/2016-voter-guidemarla-luckert (last visited Sept. 29, 2017) [https://perma.cc/5KFJ-FNUB].
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Representatives, but Democrats and moderate Republicans did not
allow it out of the Senate Judiciary Committee. This generated
substantial tensions between the governor and state senators. For
example, one member of the Kansas Senate Judiciary Committee
claimed that Governor Brownback "pointed his finger at me and said,
'Tim, why can't you go along with us on this judicial selection issue and
let us change the way we select judges so we can get judges who will
vote the way we want them to?' "52

The second set of reforms was a response to the 2014 education
ruling. In that ruling, the Kansas Supreme Court not only struck down
specific funding provisions but also reaffirmed that it-and not the
governor nor the legislature-had administrative authority to decide
the case. 53 In response, the legislature passed House Bill 2338, which
removed the Kansas Supreme Court from having administrative
authority over the lower courts. 54 This law had the effect of stripping
the supreme court's authority to appoint the chief justices of the state's
thirty-one judicial districts. In addition, to add more "bite" to its threat,
the legislature in 2015 enacted another bill, House Bill 2005, which
would have had the effect of defunding the entirety of the Kansas
judiciary if it struck down any portion of the 2014 law.55 Despite these
threats, the Kansas Supreme Court called the legislators' bluff by
striking down House Bill 2338 in December 2015, thus triggering House
Bill 2005.56 Perhaps guided by more moderate voices, the legislature
"blinked," as one reporter put it,57 by overwhelmingly (39-1) passing

House Bill 2449, making portions of House Bill 2005 invalid.58

52. Tim Carpenter, Ex-Senator Tim Owens: Ideology Drives Sam Brownback's Push for
Judicial Reform, TOPEKA CAP.-J. (Feb. 9, 2015, 4:35 PM), http://cjonline.com/legislaturestate/2015-02-09/ex-senator-tim-owens-ideology-drives-sam-brownbacks-push-judicial
[https://perma.cc/R4AL-7Y6A].
53. See Gannon v. State, 319 P.3d 1196 (Kan. 2014). See generally Trevor Graff & John
Eligon, Court Orders Kansas Legislature to Spend More on Schools, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 7, 2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/08/us/kansas-school-spending-ruling.html
[https://perma.ccl
43PR-576B].
54. H.B. 2338, 2013 Sess. (Kan. 2014). For a description and overview of opinions of H.B.
2338, see Bryan Lowry, Kansas Supreme Court Criticizes Brownback for Signing JudicialBudget,
WICHITA
EAGLE
(Apr.
18,
2014,
5:30
PM),
http://www.kansas.cominews/politicsgovernment/articlell40557.html [https://perma.cc/W3SW-CH6F].
55. H.B. 2005, 2015 Sess. (Kan. 2015).
56. See Solomon v. State, 364 P.3d 536, 549-50 (Kan. 2015) (holding that section 11 of H.B.
2338 violates the state constitution's separation of powers clause).
57. Caplan, supra note 41.
58. Jonathan Shorman, Kansas Lawmakers Send JudicialFundingFix to Governor, TOPEKA
CAP.-J. (Jan. 28, 2016 4:13 PM), http://cjonline.com/news-legislature-local-state/2016-0128/kansas-lawmakers-send-judicial-funding-fix-governor [https://perma.cclNZ8J-XGKA].
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The third proposed reform was a 2016 Senate bill 5 9 that would
expand the list of impeachable offenses for Kansas Supreme Court
justices to include "attempting to subvert fundamental laws and
introduce arbitrary power" and "attempting to usurp the power of the
legislative or executive branch of government." The bill passed
narrowly in the Senate in a 21-19 vote but died in committee without
receiving a vote in the House.
Given this history of repeated attempts, perhaps an open
question remains why Kansas political actors have so far been
unsuccessful in enacting judicial reform. We believe that one answer
speaks to the fairly pronounced shift to the right among Kansas
politicians, one that both triggered attempts at judicial reform, but also
one that was without sufficient support among more moderate
Republicans and Democrats. Indeed, unlike Florida in 2001, where
more moderate Republicans backed the reform efforts, the Kansas
reform efforts were backed only by the more conservative end of the
Republican Party. Perhaps the last reason why the reforms have yet to
succeed is that the proposed reforms were more extreme compared to
the more incremental reforms adopted in Florida.
C. Politicians Versus Voters: North Carolinain 2016
Both Florida and Kansas presented instances of conservative
political actors chafing against merit-oriented commissions and the
perceived influence of their states' bar associations. However, what
happens to judicial reform attempts when the judicial selection
mechanism relies on elections, be they partisan or nonpartisan? We now
investigate our third case study: North Carolina in 2016.
1. Judicial Selection at Time of Attempted Reform
Judges in North Carolina-including the seven judges on the
North Carolina Supreme Court-are chosen for eight-year terms and,
if they so choose, must then stand for (nonpartisan) reelection. 60

59. S.B.
439,
2016
Leg.,
Reg.
Sess.
(Kan.
2016),
http://www.kslegislature.org/li_2016b2015_16/measures/documents/sb439_02_0000.pdf
[https://perma.cc/A8A3-R9B4].
60. Article TV of the North Carolina Constitution specifies:
Justices of the Supreme Court, Judges of the Court of Appeals, and regular Judges of
the Superior Court shall be elected by the qualified voters and shall hold office for terms
of eight years and until their successors are elected and qualified. Justices of the
Supreme Court and Judges of the Court of Appeals shall be elected by the qualified
voters of the State. Regular Judges of the Superior Court may be elected by the qualified
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Although all of the elections are nonpartisan, candidates for office often
have the backing of partisan actors. At the time of the judicial reform
attempts in 2016-2017, the North Carolina Supreme Court had seven
members: six associate justices and one chief justice. 61 In 2016, before
the November presidential election, the supreme court had three
liberals and four conservatives (including its Chief Justice, Mark
Martin).
Like supreme courts in other states, the North Carolina
Supreme Court adjudicates important issues having a political
dimension-similar to both Kansas and Florida, from our examples
above. In North Carolina, the most politically contentious issue has
been redistricting, an issue that has only increased in national
importance as North Carolina has moved rapidly toward being a
national election "bellwether" state. 62 As a former member of the court
put it, "The outside interest in the [North Carolina] Supreme Court all
revolves around redistricting, and that's unfortunate. It does the court
a disservice and the candidate a disservice." 63 This sentiment is
consistent with the legal context in 2016, in which the most politically
contentious issue involving the North Carolina Supreme Court was the
legality of the congressional district map based on the 2010 U.S. Census
and approved by the state's General Assembly in 2011.
Opponents of the map claimed that the General Assembly had
engaged in significant racial gerrymandering by creating oddly shaped
districts containing the majority of the state's African-American
voters-thus "packing" them into fewer districts and reducing the
political power of African-American voters, a reliably Democratic voting
bloc. The North Carolina Supreme Court rejected these criticisms of the
plan in 2014, leading the United States Supreme Court to intervene and
order a reconsideration of the issue in 2015. Later that same year, the
North Carolina Supreme Court again upheld the dismissal of
voters of the State or by the voters of their respective districts, as the General Assembly
may prescribe.
N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 16.
61. Our analysis of the dataset provided by Bonica and Sen suggests that the 2016 ordering
of the North Carolina Supreme Court justices from more liberal to more conservative is Robin
Hudson, Cheri Beasley, Sam Ervin, Mark Martin (the Chief Justice), Robert Edmunds, Barbara
Jackson, and Paul M. Newby. The data further show that Mike Morgan, who defeated Bob
Edmunds, is more liberal than Hudson, making him the most liberal member of the court. See
Bonica & Sen, supra note 21.
62. For example, Barack Obama won North Carolina in 2008 and 2012, but Donald Trump
won the state in 2016. With fifteen electoral votes, the gains to the candidate who wins the state
are significant.
63. Mark Binker, Supreme Court Spending "All About Redistricting,"WRAL.COM (Oct. 28,
2016)
http://www.wral.com/supreme-court-spending-all-about-redistricting-/16168892
[https://perma.cc/8FKU-42HF].
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challenges to the redistricting map, a presumed victory for North
Carolina Republicans and for the General Assembly. 64 However, the
decision was a narrow 4-3 ruling along party lines. The partisan divide
on the court was made even more salient by the fact that the author of
the majority opinion-Bob Edmunds-was up for reelection in 2016.
2. Ideology of the Bar and of Political Actors
The presidential election of 2016 was highly polarizing in North
Carolina, exposing deep fault lines among the elites and among the
public. At a national level, the election of Republican Donald J. Trump
and the maintenance of Republican majorities in the U.S. House and
the U.S. Senate saw national-level political actors move to the right.
However, although Trump won the state of North Carolina (49.8% to
46.2%65), the state's Republican incumbent governor, Pat McCrory, lost
an extremely narrow prolonged contest to the Democratic challenger,
Roy Cooper. In the General Assembly, little changed. In the state's
House of Representatives, Republicans lost one seat in total but held
onto their significant majority, 74-46.66 In the State Senate,
Republicans gained one seat to hold on to their majority, 35-15.
Unlike our previous examples of Florida and Kansas, North
Carolina illustrates the additional element of a supreme court judicial
election, which also took place in 2016. That race pitted incumbent
conservative Bob Edmunds against challenger Mike Morgan, a liberal
state lower court judge. A Morgan win would have tipped the balance
on the supreme court from Republican to Democrat, while an Edmunds
win would have preserved the Republicans' slim majority in that body
and helped Republicans maintain some control over the issue of
redistricting. Thus, to a large extent, the ultimate direction of the North
Carolina Supreme Court depended not on the bar (via a merit-oriented
commission, for example), nor on political actors (via gubernatorial or
legislative appointment, for example), but on the voters of the state.
Nonetheless, we note substantial political involvement by
political actors, as is typical of nonpartisan judicial elections. Morgan,
the liberal challenger, was personally endorsed by President Barack
Obama (a Democrat) and various progressive organizations, including
64. At this point, the litigation resumed in the federal courts, culminating in Cooper v. Harris,
137 S. Ct. 1455 (2017), which held that race improperly factored into the drawing of two of North
Carolina's U.S. congressional districts.
65. North Carolina Results, N.Y. TIMES, http://www.nytimes.comlelections/iesults/northcarolina (last updated Aug. 1, 2017, 11:22 AM) [https://perma.cc/EKF9-9MWX].
66. North Carolina House of Representatives Elections, 2016,
BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/NorthCarolinaHouse ofRepresentativeselections,_2016 (last visited
Sept. 29, 2017) [https://perma.cc/VF2Z-HHNL].
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the Sierra Club and state black leadership organizations. Edmunds, the
conservative incumbent, was endorsed by various law enforcement
organizations. In addition, even though judicial races in North Carolina
are formally nonpartisan, both men were listed on their parties'
respective websites-Morgan on the North Carolina Democrats' page
and Edmunds on the Republicans' page-as candidates. In the election,
Morgan decisively defeated Edmunds, 54.5% to 45.5% (2,134,650 votes
to 1,785,437 votes).6 7
Given our theoretical framework, we also note the ideology of the
North Carolina bar. According to several scholarly studies, the bar in
North Carolina (in 2016) was overwhelmingly liberal. 68 For example,
we conducted a brief analysis using the dataset of Bonica and Sen
(2017)69 and found that, of 9,211 lawyers in the state, 72% had donated
primarily to Democrats and other liberal groups. This, we believe,
comports with public understanding in North Carolina. For example, in
its guide to judicial candidates, the North Carolina Bar Association
gives high marks to candidates endorsed by the North Carolina
Democratic Party. In addition, the Bar Association made its displeasure
with Republican-backed negative advertising well known. 70
3. Proposed Judicial Reforms
The push for judicial reform came after the 2016 election but
before the Democratic governor was inaugurated; thus, it was at the
behest of a Republican-controlled legislature and with the support of an
outgoing Republican governor. This lame-duck session of the General
Assembly enacted two bills (Senate Bill 4 and House Bill 17), which
were signed into law by the Republican Governor (on December 16,
2016 and December 19, 2016, respectively). Both were oriented toward
stripping the incoming Democratic governor of several key powersincluding stripping the governor's ability to appoint members of North

67. JudicialPerformance EvaluationSurvey-2016 Election Edition, N.C. B. ASS'N (Oct. 2016),
http://www.ncbar.org/media/705414/2016-election-edition.pdf [https://perma.cc/9G6E-PHZX].
68. See Bonica et al., supra note 14, at 324-35 (analyzing the ideological alignment of
attorneys correlated to law schools and firms); Bonica & Sen, supra note 14, at 23 (comparing the
ideological preferences of attorneys to those of judges and politicians).
69. Bonica & Sen, supra note 21.
70. For example, with regard to campaigning in the 2016 election, the Bar Association
released a statement calling for "civility and respect." Any advertisement that "attacks or maligns
the character of those seeking elective office based on performance of their judicial duties ...
threatens the public trust on which our courts depend." Statement Addresses Campaign
Advertising, N.C.
B.
ASS'N,
https://www.ncbar.org/news/statement-addresses-campaignadvertising/ (last visited Sept. 29, 2017) [https://perma.cc/LSV4-3HBE].
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Carolina's electoral boards, which were charged with overseeing the
state's elections, and shifting that to a bipartisan composition.7 1
The General Assembly also enacted several pieces of judicial
reform as part of these two pieces of legislation. The first piece of
judicial reform, part of Senate Bill 4, made judicial elections partisan
(as opposed to nonpartisan) for North Carolina Supreme Court and
Court of Appeals judges. Effectively, this reform measure would have
allowed the judges' partisan affiliations to appear next to their names
on the ballot. As others have noted, partisan elections result in
significantly greater politicization compared to either nonpartisan
elections or gubernatorial or legislative appointments systems. 72 Thus,
movement toward a partisan election would, given the ideological
landscape in North Carolina, result in a significantly more conservative
judiciary. For Republicans in the North Carolina General Assembly,
this was a straightforward move in shifting the judiciary to the rightand a particularly sensible move given the important issue of
redistricting.
The second reform, also specified in Senate Bill 4, was more
specific to the North Carolina judicial hierarchy and aimed to add a
possible extra step before cases could be appealed to the North Carolina
Supreme Court. Previously, parties looking to appeal cases to the North
Carolina Supreme Court could proceed to do so immediately after
having their cases heard by a three-judge panel of the North Carolina
Court of Appeals-an intermediate court with fifteen members, eleven
of whom were Republican at the time. After the reform, the Court of
Appeals had greater authority to rehear any appeal by sitting en banc,
with all fifteen judges sitting together. In addition, the reform measures
stripped the possibility of parties appealing certain kinds of cases (for
example, cases alleging a violation of the North Carolina or Federal
Constitution) directly from the trial court to the North Carolina
Supreme Court. For Republicans, these measures provided the
additional procedural hurdle of having more cases be processed by a
very Republican intermediate court. 73
71. As of this writing, this provision has been overturned by a North Carolina trial court.
Cooper v. Berger, No. 16 CVS 15636, 2017 WL 1433245, at *8 (N.C. Super. Ct. Mar. 17, 2017).
72. See Bonica & Sen, supra note 14, at 22-23 (discussing states with gubernatorial and
legislative appointments that do not exhibit extreme politicization trends).
73. A summary of the bill reads:
Part III will change the elections of Supreme Court Justices and Court of Appeals'
Justices from nonpartisan to partisan elections.
Part IV makes several changes to the Court of Appeals. First, section 22(a) allows the
Court of Appeals to sit en banc to hear or rehear any appeal upon the vote of a majority
of the judges on the court. Section 22(b) eliminates the right to appeal directly to the
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We also note the rumors of a third reform that would have had
the goal of increasing the number of justices on the North Carolina
Supreme Court. Because of the timing, such a "court packing" measure
would have worked well for Republicans, as it would have allowed the
outgoing Republican governor to make these appointments before the
inauguration of his Democratic successor-thus preserving a
conservative supreme court majority. However, the idea of a courtpacking plan was met with immediate and widespread criticism,
including strongly worded critiques from influential local newspapersincluding the leading newspapers in Raleigh, Charlotte, and WinstonSalem-and threats of litigation from leading civil rights groups. 74 As
of this writing, this particular reform measure appears to be moving
toward dormancy.
4. Voters' Versus Politicians' Intent
An important point here is that none of the reform measures
involved the state bar-neither in the sense of restricting the bar's
involvement nor in the sense of further involving the bar in the selection
of judges. Our framework suggests two straightforward reasons for this.
First, because it primarily relied on judicial elections, North Carolina
presented a system where the bar's involvement was already limited.
Second, because Republicans were in control of all other branches of
government, and because the bar was presumed to be left-leaning
(echoed by the scholarly looks at the topic), it would strategically make

Supreme Court from a trial court order holding an act to be facially invalid because it
violates the NC Constitution or federal law. Section 22(c) allows an appeal of right to
the Supreme Court from a decision of the Court of Appeals sitting as a panel of three in
which there is a dissent after either the Court of Appeals sitting en banc has rendered
a decision in the case (if it was heard en banc) or the time for filing a motion for
rehearing of the cause by the Court of Appeals has expired or the Court of Appeals has
denied the motion for rehearing. Section 22(d) makes several conforming changes.
Section 22(e) eliminates the right to seek discretionary review by the Supreme Court
prior to the appeal's determination by the Court of Appeal in certain cases involving
the Commissioner of Insurance. Section 22(f) eliminates the appeal of right directly to
the Supreme Court from any final order or judgment of a court declaring
unconstitutional or otherwise invalid an act apportioning or redistricting State
legislative or congressional districts. Finally, Section 23(a) amends a Rule of Civil
Procedure governing the jurisdiction over matters challenging an act's facial validity.
Fiscal Research Div., Fourth Extra Session 2016 Legislative Fiscal Note, GEN. ASSEMBLY N.C. 2
(Dec. 15, 2016), http://www.ncleg.net/Sessions/2015E4/FiscalNotes/Senate/PDF/SFNO004v1.pdf
[https://perma.cclY9S9-GMMC].
74. Mark Abadi, People in North CarolinaAre Freaking Out over Rumors of a Republican
"Power Grab" To Pack its Supreme Court, BUS. INSIDER (Dec. 7, 2016, 2:45 PM),
http://www.businessinsider.comlnorth-carolina-supreme-court-packing-pat-mccrory-2016-12
[https://perma.cc/A3YY-CC8M].
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sense to orient reforms away from increased bar involvement-an
instance that we illustrate in our previous Figure 1.
However, the situation in North Carolina highlights an
important possible link that we have so far set aside, which is the
distinction between the incentives faced by political actors and the
presumed intent of voters. Recall that our argument is one in which the
bar provides the candidates for the judiciary, and the degree to which
the bar and political actors are aligned is the "tug of war" that shapes
the judiciary. We have so far examined this tension by focusing our
attention on the ideology of political actors, and not members of the
public. We did so for two reasons. First, the ideology of political actors
corresponds closely with the ideology of voters, and, when voters lean
conservative, on average so do political actors. But second, and more
importantly, the preferences of political actors are what matter, not
necessarily those of voters.
The case of North Carolina illustrates this point. In North
Carolina, the popular vote was solidly in the Democrats' favor, with a
strong majority (54%) of North Carolinians supporting a liberal-tilted
supreme court. A strong case could be made that perhaps most North
Carolinians did not know the ideological profiles of the two men running
for the supreme court seat, but Morgan's decisive win means that, even
if many did not know, many likely voted on that basis. Even so, the
judicial reform efforts that followed were strictly in Republicans'
interests, attempting to limit the reach of the liberal judges on the
supreme court on procedural grounds and, more importantly, trying to
change the selection mechanism for the supreme court so that
partisanship and ideology would be significantly more salient.
Our conclusion from this is that of the two-political actors'
preferences or voters' preferences-it is the former that dominates, and
not necessarily the latter. Indeed, voters' preferences, as expressed by
either partisan or nonpartisan elections, represent an additional
selection mechanism that can be manipulated by the parties to
accommodate their interests.
CONCLUSION
Where does this discussion leave us? The first point, which is
consistent with other papers on this topic, is that judicial selection
mechanisms are not exogenous, fixed institutions. To the contrary,
deciding how judges are selected is, at a fundamental level, a highly
strategic political calculation, and it has been so dating back to the
constitutional convention of 1787. This has been the case particularly
because political actors have strong policy preferences, and they want
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the judiciary to reflect those preferences; in addition, the legal
profession has its own preferences. These oftentimes overlap, in which
case political actors will welcome the bar into the fold of judicial
selection. But, at other times, the preferences of political actors and
members of the bar will diverge; in these instances, we can expect to
see attempts to limit the bar's involvement in the selection and
nomination of judges. Thus, to return to some of the points raised in our
Introduction, it is appropriate to think about attempts at judicial reform
as a tug of war, with political actors on one side and the bar on the other.
The nature and ideological tone of the judiciary will largely be a
function of the preferences of these two groups.
The second point is that attempts at judicial reform are,
effectively, spillovers from this tug of war, albeit ones initiated by
political actors. Specifically, as we have shown here, the less that
politicians want the judiciary to ideologically resemble the bar, the
more they will back judicial reforms that exclude the professional bar
from weighing in on judicial selection-this includes pushing for
executive or legislative appointments or partisan elections and limiting
the use of merit-oriented commissions. By contrast, the more that
politicians want the judiciary to resemble the bar, the more they will
endorse judicial reform attempts that incorporate the bar into judicial
selection-such as merit-oriented commissions (the Missouri plan) or
even nonpartisan elections. In both scenarios, subjective evaluations of
the relative ideological positioning of the bar and of the judiciary are
the primary considerations that motivate political actors; in addition,
in both scenarios, political actors will be highly strategic in taking steps
that yield a judiciary that will be ideologically favorable.
We note that our argument for understanding attempts at
judicial reform necessarily assumes that political officials place high
value on judges' ideological leanings and that they value a politically
proximate (and thus favorable) bench. For Republicans, this means that
they favor more conservative judges; for Democrats, this means they
favor more liberal judges. For both, attempts at judicial reform are
structured accordingly. Although this is a strategic way of thinking
about judicial selection, it does raise important normative concerns that
should be considered further. For example, many commentators have
argued that current attempts at judicial reform are attempts to
interject more "politics" into the judiciary, to the detriment of the
quality and impartiality of the bench. These critiques are particularly
pronounced when the reform attempts are oriented toward limiting the
role of the bar and of merit commissions in the selection of judges.
Our findings complicate this view, however. While it is true that
interjecting politics into judicial selection changes the nature of the
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judiciary selected, it is also true that reliance on merit-oriented
commissions and the use of the professional bar does so as well. Indeed,
as has been supported by important papers in this literature7 5 and by
our other work, 76 judicial selection systems that heavily involve the
professional bar have their own ideological leaning-usually (but not
necessarily always) a more liberal one. Thus, to claim that judicial
reform attempts moving judicial selection away from the bar are
"interjecting politics" is perhaps an unfairly disparaging view of what
really is best understood as a tug of war between political parties and
the bar.
We conclude with some thoughts for future research looking at
these questions. First, our analysis here relied on a few case studies to
delineate the contours of our framework. Future research should take
a larger view into the nature of judicial reform, perhaps taking a
quantitative "large-N" look at the full breath of reform attempts across
a variety of states, ideological compositions (both of the bar and of
political actors), and judicial selection mechanisms. Second, we have
examined judicial reform attempts arising in the last twenty years. As
we have noted, however, judicial reform attempts have moved in waves,
starting with a move toward executive appointments around the time
of the American independence, then toward elections, and then finally
toward merit appointments. The current trend away from merit
appointments and back toward elections and appointments is a fairly
recent one. Although our examples draw from this more recent time
frame, we believe that our framework can be fruitfully applied toward
understanding previous attempts at judicial reform and, indeed, very
likely attempts at reform in a comparative context.

75. For example, see Fitzpatrick, supra note 9, at 676 ('In short, I am skeptical that merit
selection removes politics from judicial selection. Rather, merit selection may simply move the
politics of judicial selection into closer alignment with the ideological preferences of the bar.").
76. See Bonica & Sen, supranote 14, at 29.

